




This paper interrogates and rejects the effectiveness of consensus building 
as a mechanism for conflict resolution in Africa. Drawing from the conflict/
consensus theoretical debates of the 1960s, the paper argues that because of 
the inherent character of power, and considering the nature of the state in 
Africa which is subordinated to private interests, the political leaders will not 
readily bend to consensus. Instead of consensus the paper suggests a reform 
of the state. But beyond the reform, the paper points out the compelling need 
for the development of a virile civil society and a corresponding need for 
the re-invention of a nationalist ideology both of which will induce as well 
as facilitate the relative autonomy of the state. Thereafter, a reformed state in 
Africa will be better placed to adequately manage power and conflict.
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Consensus, though an old concept, has re-entered the lexicon of African 
political and conflict studies since the 1990s. Other related concepts making 
similar re-entry are peace-dialogue, peace-building and culture of peace. 
The sequence of their relationships may be like the riddle of whether 
the chicken or the egg came first. But it is safe to assume that a culture of 
peace certainly encourages consensus building. Our focus in this paper is on 
consensus building.
The concept of consensus building is supposed to represent a mechanism or 
an approach to be adopted towards resolving some of the many intractable 
conflicts that have bedevilled Africa, in some instances for over four decades. 
Consensus as a mechanism being advocated is rightly derivable from the 
formulations of conflict/consensus social theories which were dominant in the 
social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s.
As presently applied in Africa, consensus building seems to be a product of 
knowledge arising from researches carried out in conflict areas in Africa with 
the help of some United Nations agencies. Often international professional 
negotiators and mediators are recruited by governments or international 
agencies to be involved in the processes, including negotiations expected to 
lead to consensus. The mechanism was encouraged during the negotiations 
for peace at the end of some of the long civil wars in parts of Africa as in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and 
Southern Sudan. Also, consensus is envisaged in the resolution of the on-going 
racial, ethnic, tribal or religious wars and conflicts in Sudan/Darfur, Somalia 
and Côte d’Ivoire. It is assumed that consensus building will provide the key 
to peace in these conflict areas, or at least provide the environment which will 
enable peace to be built.
In addition to its theoretical roots in conflict/consensus social theories, 
consensus building is said to adequately fit into several of the elements of the 
democratisation process evolving in Africa at the same time that these conflicts 
are escalating. Indeed, the number of non-governmental organisations 
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(NGOs) devoted to consensus advocacy in Africa has grown as a result of the 
prospect of evolving peace through the mechanism of consensus. Many of the 
organisations have attracted generous funding from international agencies to 
organise conferences, seminars and workshops, and carry out research into 
dialogue and consensus building programmes focusing on the conflict areas in 
Africa. In a place like Rwanda, aspects of the educational curriculum are said 
to have been re-designed with the aim of re-socialising the children and the 
youth so that they may begin to cultivate attitudes that may, at least in future, 
create the environment for consensus building in their society (Mwambari and 
Schaeffer 2008). 
The purpose of this article is to scrutinise consensus advocacy, which for nearly 
twenty years (from the 1990s) has involved the organisation of conferences, 
seminars and workshops devoted to encouraging consensus building among 
groups in conflict areas in Africa. Our query derives from the conflict/
consensus social theories, but with emphasis on the interface between conflict/
consensus and the theory of power. The central argument of the paper is that 
the type of power struggle at the level of the state in Africa does not submit to 
consensus as a mechanism for resolving conflict. The paper is of the view that 
any arrangement and management of the dialogue and consensus mechanism 
in Africa which does not put the state at the centre, and therefore necessarily 
brings to the fore the structure of power in that particular society, will have 
very little chances of success. Most of the conflicts in Africa are politically 
motivated, even when they appear otherwise as when they seem to be religious. 
This is because, directly or indirectly, most of these conflicts result from the 
struggle for access to, control and management of political power. And when 
that is the case, consensus building becomes still-born.
The paper is done in three parts. The first part explores the two relevant 
concepts of conflict and consensus, and the theoretical debate about them 
which is drawn from Ralf Dahrendorf (1965, 1968); and our emphasis relates 
the debate to the theory of power. The second part analyses the import of 
power, conflict and consensus within the context of political rivalry and at 
the level of the state. The paper recounts that at the level of the state, political 
parties are dominant and remain the major objects of analysis; and that 
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consistent with their character they do not bend to consensus. In the third 
part, the paper concludes that while the consensus/dialogue advocacy may 
not be misleading, the present approaches adopted by some governments, 
international agencies and NGOs will not achieve results. This is because these 
approaches are rather intellectual and academic, and are directed mainly at 
civil society organisations. Instead, the paper suggests that an attempt should 
be made to re-create the civil society as well as re-invent a nationalist ideology 
for Africa. Both of these steps will enhance the relative autonomy of the state, 
and prepare the political system to better manage power and conflict.
Conflict, consensus and power
Conflict may be viewed as a form of tension arising from mutually exclusive or 
opposing actions, thoughts, opinions, or feelings. It is evident when individuals 
or groups evaluate situations or pass judgments from different perspectives 
that stem from incompatible differences in their education, social background 
or socialisation, or knowledge of the issues in contest. Conflict often occurs 
when people or groups perceive that as a result of a disagreement there may 
be a threat to their interests. Conflicts may also arise from misinformation, 
stereotypes, prejudices, contradictory perceptions of justice, differing socio-
cultural traditions, personal beliefs or ideologies; and they are of many 
dimensions: racial, sectarian, ethnic, religious, ideological, cultural, economic, 
political, social, and others (Kriesberg 1973:1–57; Kriesberg 2006). 
According to Dahrendorf (1965:135), conflict also involves manifest clashes 
between social forces as well as incompatible differences of objectives, such as 
a desire on the part of both contestants to attain what is available, wholly or in 
part, only to one of them. He conceptualises social conflict as the great creative 
and ever-present force that leads to change. He remarks that societies and 
social organisations are held together not by consensus (emphasis mine) but by 
constraint, not by universal agreement but by the coercion of some by others. 
Whatever is considered the ‘value system’ is mostly that of the ruling party 
and not that of the common people. At any given time, it is usually upheld 
by enforcement rather than by general acceptance. He identifies conflict, 
change and a third notion, constraint, as always going together: ‘and as conflict 
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generates change, so constraint may be thought of as generating conflict. We 
assume that conflict is ubiquitous, since constraint is ubiquitous wherever 
human beings set up social organisations ... it is always the basis of constraint 
that is at issue in social conflict’ (Dahrendorf 1968:127). 
In politics, conflict most often arises during the struggle for access to, control 
and management of political power, or during the process of determining 
what, long ago, Harold Lasswell (1990) saw as the essence of politics, which 
is ‘who gets what, when, how’. By logic of action, most conflicts often end up 
being political, because in most instances their mediation is through some 
form of ‘politics’ or public policy. Consensus advocacy is of the view that most 
conflicts can be resolved through consensus building. 
In itself, consensus represents stability, harmony, equilibrium, the universal, or 
contrat social, said to embody a broad agreement which, while not necessarily 
all-embracing, does embrace the overwhelming majority, involving unity, 
identity and co-ordination (Dahrendorf 1968:125; Atkinson 1971:236–237).
Consensus refers to a collective opinion expressing acceptance of a ‘middle 
ground’ in an outstanding issue or policy of general importance. Thus, it is a 
position of ‘no winner, no loser’, ‘no victor, no vanquished’, or a ‘give and take’ 
situation in the African parlance, which may be employed, it is assumed, in the 
many intractable socio-political crises and conflicts in Africa.
Over time, political thinkers have been concerned about the issue of conflict, 
particularly when directly or indirectly related to the structure of power in the 
society in general. 
Thomas Bernard (1983) attempted to capture much of the movement of these 
ideas, from the ancient to the modern theorists, in his comparative analysis of 
the consensus-conflict debate. In a comparison of seven pairs of theorists on 
each side of the conflict and consensus divide, Bernard identifies three levels 
at which there could be conflict/consensus: the human level, the level of the 
contemporary state of the society, and the ideal society level (Bernard 1983: 
12–15). He analyses the position of each pair at those three levels in relation 
to the predominance of consensus or conflict, and provides a particularly 
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rigorous comparative analysis of Parsons’ and Dahrendorf ’s consensus and 
conflict theories respectively (Bernard 1983:30–186, 145–186). 
In the debate, the preoccupation of the theorists was (1) how to reconcile conflict 
and consensus in relation to the enforcement of norms, rules, laws, punishment 
and sanctions; (2) how to connect the reconciliation with power, authority, 
policy and the state; and (3) how to reconcile both consensus and conflict at 
the three levels which he (Bernard) identified (Wrong 1979:89; Bernard 1983: 
12–15, 145–225). And according to Dennis Wrong (1979:89), this problem 
of reconciliation underlined the formulations of the social theories which 
were employed in the consensus/conflict debate. Dahrendorf is credited with 
having pioneered the study, highlighting the conflict/consensus divide. This 
was in reaction at the time to the consensus/equilibrium system maintenance 
of Talcott Parsons’ structural-functionalism (Dahrendorf 1965, 1968; Parsons 
1964, 1966, 1968, 1971; Wrong 1979:89–92; Bernard 1983:145–186).
The conflict model views individual or group relationships in all structures of 
power as a struggle which demonstrates some form of an irreducible element 
of coercion wherever such power structures exist (emphasis mine). On the 
other hand, the consensus model emphasises the predominance of legitimate 
authority in the society (Wrong 1979:89–91), and sees power as depending 
‘overwhelmingly on a consensual element, specifically referring to the absence 
of the use of overt physical force ...’ (Bernard 1983:153).
In his analysis, Dahrendorf (1968:173–174) remarks that the functioning 
of society means that norms regulate human conduct. This regulation is 
guaranteed by the incentive or threat of sanctions; and he argues that the 
possibility of imposing sanctions is the abstract core of all power. He goes on 
to add that established norms are nothing but ruling norms, that is, norms 
defended by the sanctioning agencies of society and those who control 
them. Wrong (1979:90) is of the view that this formulation is no different 
from Hobbes’ insistence on law as the command of the sovereign, or Marx’s 
statement that norms are dictated and enforced by the ruling class. 
All these remarks emphasise the structure of power in the society, as well as the 
determination of the extent to which consensus or conflict is permitted. However, 
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according to Bernard, part of the problem of the debate centred round the 
very broad definitions which each theorist, especially Parsons and Dahrendorf, 
gave to consensus and conflict. Apart from the problem of definition, and their 
inability to reconcile consensus/conflict at the three levels of human nature, 
the contemporary state of the society, and the ideal society, both Parsons and 
Dahrendorf agree that their two theories represent ‘two faces of society’, that 
is, that both conflict and consensus exist in the same society (Bernard 1983: 
179–186). And Bernard’s conclusion therein is that the consensus/conflict 
debate is not an empirical debate and cannot be resolved through empirical 
investigation (Bernard 1983: 217).
Nevertheless, the emphasis in this paper is on the structure of power and 
on the fact that it is most often expressed at the level of ‘the contemporary 
state of the society’. According to Bernard, what is important in examining 
the theories at the level of the contemporary state of the society is not the 
question whether there is more consensus or conflict, but the terminology 
used for the description of the society at the particular point in time (Bernard 
1983:15–16). And in Africa the literature is unambiguously replete with terms 
like ‘crisis’, ‘conflict’, ‘war’, which are all interconnected with the structure and 
struggle for power (emphasis mine). As observed by Parsons himself (Bernard 
1983:154–155), these situations, which attract overt and potential uses of force, 
do not accommodate consensus as a serious political option. The reason is not 
unrelated to the nature of political power itself, which happens to be central 
to most issues resulting in conflict, and which intrinsically resists consensus. 
For, as Thomas Weldon (1962:3) contends, ‘we may all hold that rights given 
by the constitution are sacred (consensus) and still fight one another (political 
struggle/conflict) because we cannot agree as to what these rights are’. These 
undefined and unsettled areas (what these rights are), are areas of political 
ferment, where political power incarnates, and at times get expressed in the 
most coercively unguarded forms; and most often these may only be resolved 
within the boundaries of state power which do not readily bend to consensus.
In other words, there may be consensus on some fundamental issues like 
operating a federation instead of a unitary system of government; a presidential 
system of government in the place of the cabinet system of government; two 
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instead of three terms in office; or democratic government instead of military 
dictatorship. But in a federation, for instance, there are questions about 
which states/regions are to be created, what the boundaries are to be between 
federal and state powers, and how tight or loose the federation should be. 
These questions are difficult to define and resolve. They constitute the issues 
and essence of political power, which most often are not readily subject to 
consensus. For instance, in the federal states of the DRC, Nigeria and Sudan, 
for nearly fifty years, it has been difficult to reach a consensus on how tight or 
loose the federations should be, or the boundaries between state and federal 
powers; or indeed whether or not there should be one federal government. The 
three countries have gone to war at different times to get these issues resolved. 
Also, allocation of resources or the spoils of office – the ‘who gets what, when, 
how’ issue – triggers crisis and conflict at various levels of the society. This is 
an area that has created stalemate in Côte d’Ivoire, and the crisis aftermath 
of general elections in Ethiopia (2005), Nigeria (2007), Kenya (2007) and 
Zimbabwe (2008).
Thus, as observed by Wrong while reviewing the conflict/consensus debate 
(1979:91), in social theory it is more helpful to view institutional order as 
an outcome of past and on-going political conflict than to use system theory 
that postulates an underlying consensus or a tendency towards integration 
as a way of measuring order in the society. Wrong (1979:91) points out that 
this insistence on the importance of political power and its inherent coercive 
and conflictual aspects was mostly influenced by the writings of Max Weber, 
and that it was a correction rightly introduced by Dahrendorf to the excessive 
emphasis on legitimate authority in consensus and system theory.
Related to the issue of power, there are a few basic questions that have been 
raised in the consensus debate:  where do we locate the consensus; who are 
to be involved, included or indulged in building consensus; and what is the 
content of the consensus? (Bernard 1983:178) These questions are important, 
according to the arguments of the community power theorists of the 1960s 
(Dahl 1961; Hunter 1963; Polsby 1966), because even if consensus were to be 
achieved it would be meaningless unless it involved those who ‘make things 
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move’ in the community or larger society. Answers to these queries emphasise 
the central question of power, and strengthen the argument that the dialectic 
of power frustrates consensus, particularly when those who wield power are 
put into proper (power) perspectives. This is because in order for consensus 
to be meaningful, it needs to involve those who wield power. It is at the point 
of ‘wielding’ that we also examine in the next section the anatomy of power, 
and demonstrate that in democracy those who most often wield power, the 
political parties, do not politically behave in ways that significantly concede 
to consensus. This is particularly the case in Africa since, as already indicated 
by Lasswell’s study of decades ago, there are too little democratic leadership 
and too few democratic personalities (Lasswell 1967:108–110, 150–152). This 
character of undemocratic leadership is further confirmed by recent events 
and studies about the on-going democratisation processes in Africa (Ake 
1994, 1996, 2000; Schraeder 2002; Murunga 2002; Joseph 1999; Ottaway 1999; 
Bratton and Van de Walle 1998; Chole and Ibrahim 1995).
It is also pertinent to observe that in any matter concerning consensus, the state 
in Africa is ever present and very critical. In one way or another, consensus 
takes place within state boundaries. Thus the consensus, to a larger or smaller 
extent, will require the democratic nature of the state to be fully actualised 
and sustained, even at the lowest levels of the society, whether community, 
traditional, ethnic or religious. And the most ubiquitous agent of the state 
is government (the government of the day). In present-day democracies in 
Africa, unlike in the days of military dictatorship, governments are run by 
political parties successful at the polls. Where this is the situation, it will be 
correct to argue that there is no consensus negotiated anywhere within the state 
which will not meet political parties as the foremost ‘stakeholders’, even when 
the issues in demand may appear manifestly non-political. This is the case in 
Somalia, the DRC, Uganda, Chad, Niger, Southern Sahara, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. In most of these areas, political parties or identified groups 
with political agendas are those involved in negotiations for consensus. Even 
when the issues are ethnic, religious, or socio-cultural, those sent to represent 
constituencies in negotiations for consensus are manifestly or latently political 
actors. Examples are the genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani 2002; Lemarchand 
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2008); racial conflicts in Sudan/Darfur (Flint and De Waal 2008); the religious 
riots in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria (Banjo 2009); and the Niger Delta crisis also 
in Nigeria.
More fundamentally, in each conflict area, the structure of the political party 
goes furthest to the grassroots and it is therefore best organised to respond to 
any negotiations for consensus. Therefore, in each case the party is the most 
visible organisation, even when the issues involved appear non-political. Thus, 
in spite of consensus, the members of political parties will not ignore the 
fact that their parties are struggling for political power, with all the inherent 
characteristics of political power. This largely explains why most conflicts in 
Africa seem intractable. Somalia, Sudan/Darfur, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and the 
Great Lakes Region (Lemarchand 2008) are apt examples. 
Thus, in many political crises since political independence in the 1960s in 
most parts of Africa, access to, and control and management of power for 
the purposes of resource allocation have remained the central issues under 
contest. Other factors such as tribalism or ethnicity (pluralism) have also 
been identified. But these latter factors manifested in the events of struggle for 
political power (emphasis mine) (Sklar 1966; Lloyd 1970; Ekeh 1975; Markovitz 
1977; Nnoli 1978; Young 1993). Therefore, the frequent manifestations of 
crises and conflicts around the power nexus tend to pose constraints, and 
at times frustration about consensus building, and thus limit its success as 
a mechanism for peace. As suggested above, the limitations to consensus are 
directly related to the structure and dynamics of power, which are explored 
immediately below. 
Anatomy of power and the limits of consensus
Studies indicate that the contest for power has a dynamic that differs from that 
of other social phenomena. In political studies, political power is the ultimate 
state craft, and its capture is the most consuming preoccupation of political 
actors. Several definitions are provided of what political power is, and most 
of them focus on its influence, force, coercion, manipulation, persuasion, and 
similar attributes. Other diverse features, types, categories, dimensions and 
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complexities of power are also provided and examined by scholars (Lasswell 
1967; Lasswell and Kaplan 1976; Wrong 1979; Gerth and Mills 1978; Dahl 
1970; Galbraith 1985).
In their definition, Lasswell and Kaplan (1976:85) view power as ‘the 
capacity of an individual or group of individuals to modify the conduct of 
other individuals or groups in the manner which  they desire ... the political 
process is the shaping, distribution and exercise of power ... What men seek 
in their political negotiations is power ...’. In a similar characterisation, Mills 
(1964:171) observes that ‘all politics is struggle for power; (and) the ultimate 
kind of power is violence’. Weber has a similar definition of power as ‘the 
possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behaviour of other persons’ (Gerth 
and Mills 1978:80). All these characterisations are similar to an observation by 
Robert Dahl (1970:32, 15) about the complex and awesome nature of power 
in his remarks that: 
Nothing is more likely to lead to bad political strategies than to 
misunderstand 'power', to misperceive 'the power structure'; for to be 
misled about 'power' is to be misled about the prospects and means of 
stability, change, and revolution. The graveyard of history is strewn with 
the corpses of reformers who failed not only because of the forces arrayed 
against them but because the pictures in their minds about power and 
influence were simplistic and inaccurate. 
These features of power identified by scholars show the extent to which power 
and consensus may be irreconcilable. This is especially so in Africa where 
several states have been rated as weak.  
Lord Acton identified other characteristics of power, warning against its 
ultimate, centralising and total nature, and showing how these foreclose 
consensus. This is contained in his widely quoted statement: ‘power tends to 
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ (Darlberg-Acton 1988:519–
521; Hill 2000:300–302). According to Acton, ‘great men are almost always bad 
men, even when they exercise influence and not authority ... among all the 
causes which degrade and demoralise men, power is the most constant and the 
most active’ (Darlberg-Acton 1988:519–521; Hill 2000:300–302; Dahl 1970:15). 
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Robert Michels (1968:342–356) in his study stresses that political parties make 
the winning of power by elections imperative as well as compelling through the 
oligarchical nature of their structure and organisation. In Africa such electoral 
victory is often viewed as a ‘winner-takes-all’ situation. And by the intrinsic 
characteristics of power identified, such a winner situation may not at the same 
time accommodate consensus in the control and management of political 
power. Also, in a rather bewildering expression, emphasising the critical need 
for political parties to win and maintain power, Weber states that ‘parties live in 
the house of power’ (Gerth and Mills 1978:81). Considering all the attributes 
of power, Weber’s ‘house of power’ is more or less a ‘castle of power’, especially 
in many parts of Africa. And by implication, a ‘castle of power’ which permits 
20 or 30 years of rule to one man does not have provision for consensus. This 
approximates the scenario of power structure and power struggle in Africa 
until the recent democratisation process as mentioned below. 
In his own contribution, Dahrendorf (1968:205) argues that the structure 
of power which exists in all human societies explains not only how change 
originates and what direction it takes, but also why it is necessary. He is of 
the view that ‘power always implies non-power and therefore resistance. 
The dialectic of power and resistance is the motive force of history ... Power 
produces conflict, and conflict between antagonistic interests gives lasting 
expression to the fundamental uncertainty of human existence ...’ (Dahrendorf 
1968:227). Power underlies conflict as well as underpins class differences in 
every human society (Dahrendorf 1968:227, 1967:17). If we may relate 
Dahrendorf ’s formulations to consensus in African politics, he is arguing 
that power implies inherent imbalance or lack of balance. And if there is 
imbalance or lack of balance, there will be little or no urge for those holding 
the power to commit time to consensus building, unless there is a meaningful 
threat to their control of power. This is also the political sociology of ‘winner-
takes-all’ politics in Africa, particularly because, as we will examine shortly 
below, in Africa power does not yet check power. In other words, the emphasis 
drawn from the formulations of the scholars is that the inherently awesome, 
centralising, possessive, and coercive characteristics of power do not allow 
consensus building as a meaningful way of resolving political conflict in Africa.
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While there are positive attributes of power as observed by Lasswell (1967:9), it 
is necessary that the elements, dialectic, and dynamics of power be adequately 
understood in order to appreciate why consensus may not be sustainable as 
means of resolving conflicts among political contenders in Africa. This is the 
argument of the next section of the paper. 
Power, politics and consensus building in Africa
John Galbraith (1985:19–25, 51–64) identifies three sources from which power 
is acquired: personality, property, and organisation. All sources of power are 
interconnected, and all three find most effective expression in Galbraith’s 
analysis of organisation and the state. It is within that analysis that the 
examination of political parties and power becomes appropriate (Galbraith 
1985:65–80, 140–152). In his review Galbraith observes that: ‘the modern state 
unites within its structures all three sources of power ... It has manifest access 
to all three instruments of enforcement, and these have increased over the 
years in their absolute and relative importance within the formal structure of 
government’ (Galbraith 1985:140–141). 
In a democratic order, the structure of power and instruments of enforcement 
of the powers of the state are under the control of the ruling political party. 
This is in spite of all the checks and balances in government. In Africa, with the 
degree of control that is prevalent, calls for consensus will be ‘too simplistic and 
inaccurate’ (Dahl 1970:15). Instead of consensus, Galbraith (1985:81) argues 
that control of power can only come about through a countering power. Lord 
Acton, whom we quoted earlier, expresses a similar view that it is only with 
power that power can be put in check (Darlberg-Acton 1988:521).
As we shall argue shortly, because the state in Africa lacks relative autonomy, 
state power is captured and seized by a dominant ruling interest. Accordingly, 
it becomes difficult for power to effectively check power, because the dominant 
interest that captures the state ensures that it has a monopoly of state power, 
which hitherto in Africa has been near absolute and overwhelming (‘the 
winner-takes-all’ situation/politics). However in more recent times, prospects 
for challenges to power, though not yet effective, have been increasing with the 
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emergence of democratisation processes of the 1990s in Africa (Bratton and 
Van de Walle 1998; Onuoha and Fadakinte 2002; Muranga 2002). 
Put differently, it may be argued that countering power with power, as argued 
by Galbraith, theoretically presupposes that the state possesses the known 
attributes of ‘relative autonomy’, and plays the role of an arbiter among group 
interests within the society (Gramsci 1971; Showstack 1987).1 But states in 
Africa lack these attributes (Ake 1985, 1994). The pioneer political leaders who 
struggled for political independence from the colonial masters in the 1960s 
appropriated the benefits of political independence, especially through the 
use of political power to expropriate economic resources, at the same time 
deploying these resources of the state to consolidate their grip on political 
power. This trend of thought is an extensive discourse of politics in Africa in 
the social sciences literature, and has provided a fundamental interpretation of 
the crises and conflicts in Africa from the 1960s to date (Carter 1966; Rotberg 
and Mazrui 1970; Lofchie 1971; Markovitz 1977; Ake 1981, 1994; Jackson and 
Rosberg 1982; Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Fatton 1992; Bayart 1993; Bayart, 
Ellis and Hibou 1999; Joseph 1991; Joseph 1999). Indeed, the struggle for 
political power has intensified with the years, attracting a higher premium for 
every new set of struggle, like during elections, formation of new governments, 
or even struggle for citizenship (Ake 1994, 1996, 2000; Joseph 1999; Ottaway 
1999; Schraeder 2002; Lemarchand 2008).
According to Claude Ake, a more disturbing aspect of this development is 
that by the beginning of the twenty first century, African political leaders had 
nothing meaningful in their agenda to reform this character of the state, a 
1 ‘Relative autonomy’ raises the question about the extent to which a state under capitalism 
may be relatively free from domination by the various competing interests within the 
system. The formulation assumes that no state may be absolutely free from domination. 
The fundamental concern is that being relatively autonomous is necessary for the state 
to be neutral, an arbiter, an umpire, and not unduly favouring one particular interest or 
the other, in enforcing the laws, and thereby defining the extent to which the rule of law 
may be said to apply. The issue of  ‘Relative autonomy’ of the state, deriving from Antonio 
Gramsci’s formulations, was a stimulating scholarly debate among radical scholars 
in Europe between the late 1960s and middle of the 1980s, demonstrated in the robust 
engagements of Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband. African scholars of radical bent 
extensively employed the analysis to examine the problem of the state in Africa.
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reform which would enhance the state’s character of ‘relative autonomy’ and 
mediation, and which would enable it to ensure the rule of law and impartially 
resolve conflicts among the dominant interests in the entire society (Ake 
1994:8–9). The reform may not meaningfully take place now, because those 
controlling the state are beneficiaries of the present character of the state, and 
are aware of the enormous power of the state under their control. Under such a 
power imbalance, consensus will not be attractive to those in dominant control 
of the instruments of state power. 
Instead of consensus, there may be party coalitions and alliances of senior 
and junior partners determined by relative successes at the polls, or ethnic 
compacts in some cases (Schraeder 2004:106–110). Indeed, in the analyses 
of power/consensus relationships, a hidden reality is that the demand for 
consensus arises from the point at which power is assumed to have failed or is 
failing. In other words, a strong demand for consensus may be an indication 
that those wielding power are getting weak, and losing control of power, and 
contenders getting stronger and more confident to challenge power by asking 
for consensus (Wrong 1979:88). 
In addition to the problem of power, there is also the issue of justice in the 
exercise of political power – which may not be left out in cases of conflict and 
consensus in Africa. Studies of justice explain the persistent demand for justice 
as a factor in most conflicts, including those in Africa (Rawls 1971). Thus, even 
if consensus and stability were regarded as desirable, forms of injustice like 
corruption, oppression, manifest deprivations, and other forms of violation of 
human rights, may instigate long-drawn struggles for freedom. And unless the 
offending issues are resolved, no amount of advocacy or organisation will allow 
room for consensus building. In his analysis of the subject, Rawls (1971:4–55) 
stresses that there must be a measure of agreement on what is social justice for 
there to be a viable human community. He holds the state (the African state 
in this case) responsible for the provision of the ideal political environment 
for the enforcement of justice in the rest of society. In a related study, Sen 
(2004:338–350) argues that these rights include welfare rights, which stand to 
reason, and are clearly needed, even if the obligation of the state in meeting 
these rights is an imperfect one. The failure of African leaders to fulfil these 
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obligations, as well as uphold other larger issues of justice, gives rise to most of 
the crises and conflicts which are at present perplexing Africa. And with such 
disregard for obligations, consensus and peacebuilding may not be achieved. 
In the circumstances, consensus, as much as it is desirable, may be sought 
elsewhere in the civil society. This is the argument in our conclusion.
Conclusion: The Civil Society Ideology and consensus 
building
This paper has argued that in Africa, consensus building among political actors 
may not succeed in most circumstances involving the struggle for power. It 
is our suggestion that there is a need to adequately understand the theory of 
power, as it is power that most often underpins conflicts, in order to appreciate 
the limitations of consensus building in Africa. We further suggest that rather 
than advocate consensus building, which may not be attainable under the 
dialectic of political power, there should be an endeavour to reform the state, 
and above all, build a virile civil society with a dominant nationalist ideology.
Civil society is comprised of various interest and pressure groups, including 
non-governmental organisations, who in themselves constitute the national 
sovereign, and whose interactions most of the time are ‘outside the state’, and 
on the basis of trust and consensus (Seligman 1992; Harberson, Rothchild 
and Chazan 1994; Hall 1995). The consensus includes their recognised role 
as vanguard, the last ditch of protection for human rights, and as promoters 
of democracy and good governance. According to Lipset (1994:7), private 
associations (the civil society) are sources of restrictions on the government 
and serve as major channels for involving people in politics; they are also 
mechanisms for creating and maintaining the consensus necessary for a 
democratic order. In other words, because the civil society does not struggle 
for political power, it is easier for members to function by persuasion, 
cooperation and compromise, and to become oriented towards consensus in 
their interactions (Atkinson 1971:236–239). However, in Africa this may not 
always be the case, because there are times when ‘politics’ intrudes into and 
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bogs down the activities of civil society groups. Nevertheless, the features of a 
stronger civil society make consensus building relatively easier to achieve. 
At the same time, it gives cause for grave concern that currently there is no 
serious endeavour by African governments, through investment in policies, 
to consciously build the civil society in Africa. Such policies should include 
good governance first and foremost. Also to be promoted are youth education 
programmes containing special national values planned and implemented 
as socialisation processes in schools, youth organisation/association centres, 
churches, mosques, community centres and professional associations. In the 
1990s civil society organisations were active and indeed crucial during the 
early years of democratic transition in Africa (Olukoshi 1997; Bratton and Van 
de Walle 1998; Makumbe 1998). But apparently they lost steam after the initial 
elections that introduced foundation democratic governments at the time. 
With some exceptions, civil society in Africa seems to be disappointingly weak. 
Also there is little awareness among the citizens of the relevance of the civil 
society, and no evidence of their reliance on it as a force that can bring the 
political actors under control – the type of control which, according to Lipset 
(1994:7), civil societies exercised in developed countries at that time in history, 
as watch dog and the ultimate sovereign. 
However, it is important to emphasise that there can be no virile civil society 
without an ideology: a world view, a guide, a value system, a national spirit 
around which all societal actions revolve; which gives strength, meaning, 
direction, and interpretation of the world to the whole society (Mannheim 
1976; Apter 1965). 
According to Friedrich and Brzezinski (1964:71–96), ideology is ‘the general 
system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity; that is … 
it is a system of ideas and values which are oriented towards the evaluative 
integration of the collectivity and of the situation in which they are placed, 
the processes by which they have developed to their given state, the goals 
towards which the members are collectively oriented, and their relation to the 
future course of events’ (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1964:88). Also confirming 
the centrality of ideology to national consciousness, direction and philosophy, 
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Weldon (1962:7) observes that ‘inevitably ... unless disputants are agreed on 
something quite different, namely an abstract political principle (ideology), 
they will, and can lead to no conclusion’.
The issue of ideology and its role in national development is a tested and 
canvassed subject. In Africa it was an advocated ingredient of development 
in some countries from the 1960s to the 1980s. Its inclusion in development 
thinking began to decline with the economic recession of the 1980s, especially 
when it failed to advance development in those countries which introduced 
such ideological content and guide to their development efforts, in particular, 
Nyerere’s Tanzania, and some Marxist-oriented economies in Africa (Young 
1982; Hyden 1983; Lubeck 1987; Keller and Rothchild 1987; Cohen and 
Gouldbourne 1991; Hughes 1992; Apter and Rosberg 1994).
Nevertheless, ideology is being reconsidered in the African context because 
of the quest for a positive, creative, cohesive, and aggregative value system, 
the type achieved by the Asian Tigers, reputed to be rooted in the values of 
Confucianism (World Bank 1995; Hill 1997). It is a value system which insists 
on nationalism, moral values and thrift in the macroeconomic principles of 
management, openness and equity; thrift/savings and austerity instead of the 
profligacy and the high level of corruption prevalent in Africa.
The use of ideology in this discussion is deliberately conceived to include 
all efforts to internalise constructive and guiding principles in the peoples’ 
productive capacities which will enable them to take control of their 
environment and develop it with their own knowledge and expertise. Here we 
are suggesting nationalism to be the ruling ideology for African states. 
Nationalism refers to collective feelings and identities, emotions, behaviour, 
norms, and values which develop and elevate a single spirit of nationhood 
above all other elements and characteristics. Nationalism involves shared 
beliefs, characteristics, and a common goal as one people. While there may be 
sub-cultures, there remains a common overarching cultural value which binds 
the people of a single nationhood; and their attitudes, beliefs and behaviour 
become influenced by that common cultural value. Nationalism is usually 
evolved and built by nation-builders who emerge with the values. The values 
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of the emergent leadership usually become higher and dominant, and are 
accepted by the majority of the people at the time. In turn, both the leadership 
and the people stand to maintain and defend the values. In many instances 
this formation process is related to the idea of building hegemony, and may be 
studied under that rubric (Gramsci 1971; Gray 1977; Joseph 2002). 
However, critical to the success of national ideology is that the ideology 
necessarily has to be indigenous (Kedourie 1970; Nyerere 1982; Low 1982; Hyden 
1983; Neuberger 1986). In a recent paper emphasising indigenousness and 
autonomy, William Easterly (2007) argues that instead of the ‘developmentalist 
ideology’ of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Africans 
should develop a homegrown path to success, and ignore the ‘developmentalists’ 
like the Asians always did in their path to development. But in Africa, one of 
the weaknesses of previous attempts at building the ideology of development 
was that none of the ideologies was ‘homegrown’, or sufficiently indigenous to 
become a national guide. Also, they were not rooted in the culture.
The indications are that without a common ruling ideology, consensus even 
at the level of the civil society becomes very difficult. If there were a common 
ideology, even if consensus were not built, political parties could go into 
accords, coalitions or alliances. In such cases, politically, the preoccupation will 
be the effort to keep coalition agreements. But political parties in Africa most 
often do not keep such agreements. The coalitions break down not because 
consensus was not built, but because the exploitative and accumulative 
tendencies of most African leaders do not allow them to respect agreements 
entered into with other political leaders. Certainly, political leaders who cannot 
keep coalition agreements will be the least disposed to consensus building. 
Therefore consensus, strictly speaking, lies outside the context and exercise 
of party politics. Instead, it is the consensus within the civil society which 
influences the behaviour and actions of the parties, and which acts as a check 
on them, and makes them invoke a nationalist ideology as a recourse in cases 
which otherwise would bring conflict. This is further confirmed by Lipset, 
referring to Tocqueville’s observation that voluntary associations limit the 
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central power, create new and autonomous centres of power to compete with it, 
and help to train potential opposition leaders in political skills (Lipset 1994:8). 
In conclusion, it is pertinent to observe that at present, the issue of building 
an ideology is totally missing from the agendas of most African states, and 
worse still, missing from the research focus in African higher institutions and 
research centres. There is little evidence of current research on ideology in 
African institutions and in major current publications on that subject matter.
It is our view in this paper that there is need for research to be directed towards 
inventing an ideology of nationalism which will guide political party activities, 
national politics and all aspects of public policy, including the preservation of 
socio-cultural values. If a nationalist ideology is built, it will support the rule of 
law, constitutionalism, justice, accountability and good governance which will 
prevail at the level of the state, while at the level of the civil society, consensus 
building will still remain under the guiding influence of the same ideology. Of 
course this recognises the interconnection known to exist between the state 
and civil society as well as the fact that both reinforce each other.
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